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Brooke de Lench* and Lindsey Barton Straus** 
Standard-Setting by Non-Governmental Agencies 
in the Field of Sports Safety Equipment: Promoting 
the Interests of Consumers or Manufacturers? 
Introduction 
Growing public concern over sports concussions’ health consequences has 
spawned a burgeoning safety-equipment industry.1 In recent years, innovators have 
developed “intelligent” chinstraps and mouth guards, high-tech helmets, “neuro-
protective” sports drinks, and head impact sensors.2 Unfortunately, the government 
has not actively regulated many of these products.3 Instead, non-governmental or-
ganizations (“NGOs”), such as the National Operating Committee on Standards for 
Athletic Equipment (“NOCSAE”), set performance safety standards with which 
manufacturers of football helmets and other sports safety equipment voluntarily 
 
© 2015 Brooke de Lench, Lindsey Barton Straus 
The facts and opinions expressed in the articles published in this Journal are solely those of the authors and do 
not represent the views of the editors, the editorial board, or the University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law. 
 *  Brooke de Lench is Executive Director, MomsTEAM Institute, Founder of MomsTEAM.com, author 
of “Home Team Advantage: The Critical Role of Mothers in Youth Sports” (Harper Perennial 2006), and Pro-
ducer of “THE SMARTEST TEAM: Making High School Football Safer” (PBS). 
 **  J.D. 1977, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. Lindsey Barton Straus is Director 
of Research and Senior Editor at MomsTEAM Institute, and an attorney who previously worked at Mirick, 
O’Connell, DeMallie & Lougee, Mobil Oil Corporation, and DLA Piper. 
1.      Bob Hohler, Conflicts Arise in Sports-Related Concussions Fight, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2014, available at 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2014/08/10/concerns-arise-over-group-certifying-head-impact-sensors/gh 
5mJDYV8jcS8Ik7DiF6kN/story.html (“[M]ounting concern over head injuries has spawned a financial boom in 
the concussion-prevention industry.”). 
2.      Julie Deardorff, FTC Cracks Down on Anti-Concussion Claims, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 6, 2012), http://articles.c 
hicagotribune.com/2012-09-06/health/ct-met-mouthguard-concussions-20120906_1_ftc-cracks-brain-pad-brai 
n-protection; see, e.g., The Technology, BATTLE SPORTS SCI., http://www.battlesportsscience.com/products/impac 
t-indicator/the-technology/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). 
3.      The Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) sets bicycle helmet minimum performance 
standards, but not football helmet standards.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2058, 6001–6006 (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 1203 
(2014).  The Youth Sports Concussion Act, S. 1014, 113th Cong. (2013) would have authorized the CPSC to 
make recommendations to manufacturers and promulgate new consumer rules for protective equipment based 
on research findings.  See Press Release, Senator Tom Udall, Udall, Rockefeller Introduce Bill to Help Protect 
Young Athletes from Sports-Related Traumatic Brain Injuries (May 22, 2013), http://www.tomudall.senate.gov 
/?p=press_release&id=1305. 
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certify compliance.4 However, decisions made by these NGOs must be thoroughly 
reviewed since manufacturers pay licensing fees, which provide organizations like 
NOCSAE with nearly all of their funding.5 
In July 2013, NOCSAE published a press release on its website stating that foot-
ball helmets equipped with add-on products that were not originally affixed to the 
helmet during lab testing “void[ ] . . . [helmet manufacturers’] certification of com-
pliance with the NOCSAE standard.”6 It is not known what triggered NOCSAE to 
issue its statement, or whether it was requested by a helmet manufacturer.7 In any 
event, NOCSAE provided no warning to stakeholders, and afforded the public no 
opportunity to comment, as would have occurred if a government agency had pro-
posed such a rule.8 Nor, apparently, did it invite add-on manufacturers to submit 
test data to show that their products, when added to helmets, still met its helmet 
standards. Instead, NOCSAE announced that its Board of Directors had decided—
to protect the integrity of its existing standards—that “[t]he addition of after-
market items by anyone that changes or alters the protective system by adding or 
 
4.      FAQs, NAT’L OPERATING COMM. ON STANDARDS FOR ATHLETIC EQUIP., http://nocsae.org/about-
nocsae/faqs/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).  Another NGO that sets sports-safety equipment standards is ASTM 
International. See, e.g., Committee F08 on Sports Equipment, Playing Surfaces, and Facilities, ASTM INT’L, http://w 
ww.astm.org/COMMIT/SUBCOMMIT/F08.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
5.      See NOCSAE Overview, NAT’L OPERATING COMM. ON STANDARDS FOR ATHLETIC EQUIP. (June 2014), 
http://nocsae.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/NOCSAE-Overview-Updated-June-2014-FINAL.pdf [hereinaf-
ter NOCSAE Overview] (“NOCSAE is . . . funded primarily through licensing fees it charges to equipment 
manufacturers that want to certify or recertify equipment to the NOCSAE standards.”); see also Bob Hohler, 
The Concussion Doctor’s Tangled Interest, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2013 
/12/29/america-concussion-doctor-navigates-tangled-web-connections/SKKOnbhJvw0kx1VEnk1ZNP/story.ht 
ml (explaining that NOCSAE receives “nearly 100 percent of [their] money” from helmet manufacturers). 
6.     Statement, Nat’l Operating Comm. on Standards for Athletic Equip., NOCSAE Statement on Third Par-
ty Helmet Add-on Products and Certification (July 16, 2013), http://nocsae.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/T 
hird-party-add-on-statement-with-letterhead.pdf [hereinafter NOCSAE July 2013 Statement].  
7.     A request from a helmet manufacturer would not be without precedent. See Lorraine Mirabella, Lacrosse 
Brand STX Flagged Competitor Flaws, Launches new Helmet, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 9, 2014, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-stx-lacrosse-helmet-controversy-20141208-story.html#page=1 
(“Just days after lacrosse brand STX unveiled its first helmets for the fast-growing sport, the helmets of 
two bigger rivals in the category were deemed unsafe. The turn of events for STX wasn't a fluke. The Baltimore 
company tipped off the organization that sets safety standards for the equipment. STX, maker of lacrosse sticks 
and other equipment, was testing its Stallion helmet last summer when it found that two competitors' models 
failed to meet performance standards. The response has been swift. The National Operating Committee on 
Standards for Athletic Equipment voided certifications for those helmets last month . . . . NOCSAE, which post-
ed responses to questions on its website, said it based its decision on its own independent investigation, but said 
that was prompted by the third-party laboratory test results obtained by Schutt and STX.”); NOCSAE Decision 
to Void Certification of Warrior Regulator and Cascade R Lacrosse Helmets: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L 
OPERATING COMM. ON STANDARDS FOR ATHLETIC EQUIP (Dec. 2014), http://nocsae.org/wp-content/uploads/201 
4/12/Lax-QA-12-8-2014-Copy.pdf [hereafter NOCSAE Lacrosse Helmet FAQs] (“NOCSAE’s decision to void 
certification of [two lacrosse helmet] models was based solely on data developed from its own independent in-
vestigation and included confidential data that was not available to any competitor . . . .[but t]he decision to 
begin an investigation into these two models was prompted by third-party laboratory test results obtained by 
Schutt/STX and sent simultaneously to NOCSAE and the national governing bodies. . . .”).  
8.      See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring government agencies to publish proposed rules in the Federal Reg-
ister and allow interested persons an opportunity to comment). 
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deleting protective padding . . . or which changes or alters the geometry of the shell 
or adds mass to the helmet . . . voids the certification of compliance with the 
NOCSAE standard.”9 NOCSAE’s July statement appears to have prompted some 
teams, coaches, and at least one state high school athletic association (Colorado) to 
bar use of some third-party add-on products.10   
On August 7, 2013, amid growing inquiries from coaches, parents, and school 
boards about how third-party helmet add-ons affected helmet certification,11 
NOCSAE clarified its July 2013 statement (hereinafter “Add-On Statement”).12 In-
stead of deciding that an addition to a helmet automatically rendered the manufac-
turers’ certification void, NOCSAE said it would now leave it up to the helmet 
manufacturers themselves to decide whether a particular third-party add-on affixed 
to the helmet, such as an impact sensor, voided its own certification.13 NOCSAE also 
said that helmet manufacturers could decide to engage in additional certification 
testing of the new model and certify the new model with the add-on product, but 
was not required to do so.14 Finally, NOCSAE said it would allow manufacturers of 
add-on products for football helmets to make their own certification of compliance 
with its standard, as long as the certification testing was done according to 
NOCSAE standards and the add-on manufacturer assumed responsibility (in other 
words, potential legal liability) for the helmet/add-on combination.15 It also ex-
empted from coverage products such as skull caps (i.e. MC10/Reebok’s Checklight), 
headbands, mouth guards, ear inserts, and other items that are not attached or in-
corporated in some way into the helmet.16 
Three weeks after NOCSAE issued the Add-On Statement, and after it had pre-
viously introduced its own football helmet with a built-in impact sensor,17 one hel-
 
9.      See NOCSAE July 2013 Statement, supra note 6. 
10.   See Lindsey Sablan, Colorado High Schools Banned from Using Football Helmets Cover That Claims to Re-
duce Concussion Risk, 7NEWS DENVER (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-
news/high-schools-banned-from-using-football-helmet-cover-that-claims-to-reduce-risk-of-concussions; see a- 
lso John Sadler,  Add-on Helmet Products: Should they be Permitted in Youth Football Leagues?, SADLER SPORTS & 
RECREATION INSURANCE, http://www.sadlersports.com/blog/youth-football-leagues-add-helmet-products/ (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Sadler Blog] (noting that the July 16 NOCSAE press release “likely prompted 
the Colorado High School Activities Association (CHSAA) to prohibit the use of add-on products during 
games.”).  
11.    See Report: FTC Investigating NOCSAE's Football Helmet Certification Process, NAT’L SPORTING GOODS 
ASS’N, http://www.sportsonesource.com/news/article_home.asp?Prod=3&section=8&id=52737 (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Report: FTC Investigation]. 
12.     Statement, Nat’l Operating Comm. on Standards for Athletic Equip., Certification to NOCSAE Stand-
ards and Add-on Helmet Products (Aug. 7, 2013), http://nocsae.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/NOCSAE-Ad 
d-on-Fact-Statement-8-7.pdf [hereinafter NOCSAE Add-On Statement]. 
13.      Id. 
14.      Id. 
15.      Id. 
16.      Id. 
17.   See, Katie Linendoll, Riddell Unveils new Wireless Helmet Tech, ESPN.COM (Jan. 8, 2013. 11:00 AM), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/3595/riddell-unveils-new-wireless-helmet-tech. 
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met company original equipment manufacturer (“OEM”), Riddell, issued a blanket 
statement that modifying any of its helmets or face masks in any way would be 
viewed by Riddell as voiding its certification of compliance with NOCSAE stand-
ards.18 The company’s statement went on to recommend against the use of any third 
party aftermarket accessories altering the fit, form or function of Riddell helmets or 
face masks, not just because such modifications voided its certification, but because, 
in its view, it “render[ed] the helmet or face mask illegal for most organized play.”19 
The other helmet company OEMs, none of which have brought to market helmets 
equipped with sensors,20 have not followed suit (at least in terms of issuing formal 
announcements), leaving the status of their helmets equipped with such add-ons in 
certification limbo.21 
This Article advances three arguments. First, it maintains that by allowing hel-
met manufacturers to “veto” the use of third-party safety equipment with their 
helmets absent re-certification, NOCSAE, in effect, is conferring on them the power 
to control third-party sensor companies who lack the financial resources necessary 
to bear the enormous cost of testing helmets with sensors,22 potentially clearing the 
way for the helmet companies themselves to possibly capture the market for such 
products.23 Second, it argues that the NOCSAE Add-On Statement is an unneces-
sarily restrictive certification standard which, in its current form, prevents even ex-
tremely light sensors from being added to helmets without triggering an expensive, 
helmet-by-helmet re-certification process, or requiring helmet manufacturer ap-
proval.24 Third, this Article suggests that NOCSAE’s Add-On Statement struck a 
 
18.    Riddell Response to Address Aftermarket Accessories and NOCSAE Certification, RIDDELL NEWSROOM 
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://news.riddell.com/info/releases/riddell-response-to-address-aftermarket-accessories-and-
nocsae-certification [hereinafter Riddell Response]. 
19.     Id. (emphasis added). 
20.    Schutt announced in 2008 that it was testing a helmet sensor, but never brought it to market, See Brett 
Zarda, On the Field, Fewer Blows to the Head: A New, Cheap, Helmet Retrofit May be the Key to Averting Concus-
sions,  POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.popsci.com/score/article/2008-04/field-fewer-blows-head. 
21.    The authors have been unable to find any evidence that helmet companies, other than Riddell, have tak-
en steps to correct the impression left by the July 2013 NOCSAE statement, or, like Riddell, exercised their right 
under the NOCSAE update to declare their certifications void. Such silence thus creates a legal risk to any 
school or club, which allows an add-on device on a helmet in a youth football program, that, in the event of an 
injury and lawsuit, the helmet manufacturer will take the position that its certification of compliance with the 
NOCSAE standard was void. See Sadler Blog, supra note 10.  
22.    See Bob Roble, Making an Impact on Head Injuries: The Tech Behind Football Helmets, IQ SPORTS (Nov. 
25, 2013), http://iq.intel.com/making-an-impact-on-head-injuries-the-tech-behind-football-helmets/ (report-
ing that Glen Beckman, Director of Marketing Communications, Schutt Sports,  estimated that, “[w]ith all the 
different sized helmets needing to be tested at different impact force and angles,” the cost would be at least $1 
million); Report: FTC Investigation, supra note 11 (reporting that Guardian Cap representatives estimated that 
the NOCSAE update would require the company to test 40,000 helmets to meet NOCSAE standards at $750-
$1,000 per helmet, and that the Co-Founder and CEO of Brain Sentry, which manufactures sensors which are 
attached to the outside of football helmets, asserted that there was “no practical way for a third-party add-on 
company to certify their product”). 
23. See infra Part I. 
24. See infra Part II. 
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balance between protecting the integrity of its standards and its “mission to pro-
mote safety,” which tipped heavily in favor of protecting the standards.25 Following 
this discussion, this Article evaluates helmet manufacturers’ response and proposes 
a path forward.26 
I. NOCSAE’s Add-On Statement, in Effect, Empowers Helmet Manu-
facturers to Control the Third-Party Add-On Market 
Although NOCSAE has emphasized that helmet manufacturers adhere to its stand-
ards voluntarily,27 some governing bodies have required these standards at all levels 
of play.28 Unsurprisingly, NOCSAE’s statements have appeared to make schools and 
youth football programs extremely reluctant, if not entirely unwilling or unable, to 
allow sensors and other safety equipment to be added to players’ helmets.29 
In just the first two weeks after NOCSAE released its July statement, after-market 
safety equipment manufacturers felt its profound impact. In August 2013, just days 
after a local newspaper reported that more than a dozen Colorado high-schools had 
decided to use Guardian Cap, a supplemental padding which goes on the outside of 
a helmet, the Colorado High School Athletic Association banned the cap from 
games and strongly encouraged schools not to use it during practices.30 
NOCSAE’s statements have continued to adversely affect sensor companies into 
the 2014 football season. While the Arena Football League equips its helmets with 
Brain Sentry sensors,31 high schools have been extremely reluctant or completely 
unwilling to follow suit. When Brain Sentry offered sensors to football and lacrosse 
players at a Virginia high-school, county officials declined.32 They said the sensors 
lacked sufficient testing and could void the manufacturers’ certification of compli-
 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Parts IV–V. 
27.      See FAQs, supra note 4. 
28.    See Corey McLaughlin, Update: NOCSAE Voids Certification of Cascade R, Warrior Regulator Helmets, 
LACROSSE MAG. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://laxmagazine.com/genrel/112414_nocsae_says_cacsade_r_and_warrior_re 
gulator_helmets_dont_meet_standard (“Under NCAA, NFHS (National Federation of State High School Asso-
ciations) and US Lacrosse rules, helmets are required to meet the NOCSAE standard . . . .”). 
29. See Bill Bradley, Guardian Cap Caught in Catch-22 After NOCSAE Statement, NFL.COM (Aug. 2, 2013, 
10:44 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000223873/article/guardian-cap-caught-in-catch22-after-n 
ocsae-statement.  See also Tom Jackman, Loudoun Valley Football Parents Fight for Helmet Sensors, But Adminis-
trators Decline, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/loudoun-valley-football-pare 
nts-fight-for-helmet-sensors-but-administrators-decline/2014/08/07/7bb32bec-1d8d-11e4-ae540cfe1f974f8a_st 
ory.html (referencing a Virginia high school’s decision to decline free helmet sensors because the device could 
“void th[eir school] helmets’ safety certifications”). In light of Riddell’s announcement in August 2013 that add-
ing sensors to its helmets not only voided its certification with NOCSAE standard but rendered the helmets 
illegal, such concerns were clearly warranted. See Riddell Response, supra note 18. 
30. Bradley, supra note 29. 
31. Press Release, Arena Football League, AFL Becomes First Professional Sports League to Require Helmet 
Sensors (June 26, 2014), available at http://www.arenafootball.com/sports/a-footbl/spec-rel/062614aaa.html 
[hereinafter Press Release, Arena Football League]. 
32. See Jackman, supra note 29. 
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ance with NOCSAE’s standards.33 The decision set off a battle with parents, who de-
fied school system orders and affixed sensors to their children’s helmets.34 In re-
sponse, administrators instructed coaches to suspend athletes until they removed 
the sensors.35 
In effect, NOCSAE’s decision empowers helmet manufacturers to act as third-
party technology gatekeepers. Because amateur sports leagues risk voiding the hel-
met manufacturer’s certification that it complies with NOCSAE standards if they 
add sensors to the helmets,36 sensor manufacturers are left to choose with three un-
palatable choices in order to sell their product to schools and youth football clubs: 
(1) obtain certification through testing and certification by the helmet manufactur-
ers,37 (2) make their own certification of compliance with the NOCSAE standard,38 
or (3) sell their products without any certification. Since NOCSAE requires a sepa-
rate certification process for each helmet model,39 sensor companies face a Hobson’s 
choice: shoulder the million dollar expense to obtain certification, or forgo that ex-
pense and hope to persuade schools and clubs to buy their products without such 
certification, thereby eliminating any claim against helmet manufacturers in the 
event that a catastrophic head or neck injury occurs in the program.40 Helmet com-
panies have little, if any, reason to cooperate with sensor companies: sensor data 
might indicate that helmets are unable to properly protect athletes against the forces 
that cause concussions.41 
Indeed, one sensor-manufacturer’s CEO even went so far as to suggest that anti-
competitive motives, not technical concerns, may have prompted the Add-On 
Statement.42 One could reasonably infer that NOCSAE’s Add-On Statement impos-
 
33. Id.  
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See NOCSAE Add-On Statement, supra note 12 (acknowledging that “the manufacturer which made 
the original certification has the right, under NOCSAE standards, to declare its certification void” if an item is 
added to the helmet); Jackman, supra note 29 (explaining that high-school officials declined to put sensors on 
football players’ helmets because it could void the helmets NOCSAE certification). 
37. See Certification/Recertification and Alteration, NAERA, http://www.naera.net/what_cert.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 11, 2014) (noting that “the NOCSAE helmet standard is not a warranty, but simply a statement that a 
particular helmet model met the requirements of performance test when it was manufactured or recertified”). 
38.      NOCSAE Add-On Statement, supra note 12. 
39.      Id. 
40.     According to one sports insurance expert, “major helmet manufacturers likely carry a combined Gen-
eral Liability/Excess Liability insurance limit in the range of $10M to $25M[,]” while the add-on product manu-
facturers likely carry much lower limits of liability insurance due to their “restricted start-up budgets.”  Sadler 
Blog, supra note 10.  As a result, the expert recommends following the helmet manufacturers’ position regard-
ing the use of add-on products.  Id. 
41.    But see Schutt Sports to Offer Brain Sentry Impact Sensors on Football Helmets, PRWEB (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2015/01/prweb12431581.htm (discussing that Schutt Sports agreed to allow 
impact sensors on their helmets). 
42.      See E-mail from Danny Crossman, Chief Executive Officer, Impakt Protective Inc., to Brooke de 
Lench, Executive Director, MomsTEAM Institute (July 21, 2013, 9:07 PM) (on file with author).  
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es cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive certification requirements on 
third-party manufacturers, which limits sensor companies’ ability to compete and 
discourages competition in a burgeoning industry. Some may say that such a sug-
gestion goes too far. Nevertheless, according to one report, the Add-On Statement 
has drawn the attention of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which has 
asked NOCSAE to produce documents pertaining to the certification process for 
third-party add-on products.43 
Though the FTC would not confirm the investigation, NOCSAE’s Executive Di-
rector acknowledged that the organization was working with outside counsel to re-
spond to an FTC document request.44 Anonymous sources who had been contacted 
by the FTC told Sports Executive Weekly that the probe appeared to focus at least in 
part on what role certificates of compliance with NOCSAE standards by helmet 
manufacturers play in determining what equipment football leagues, coaches, ath-
letic directors, and parents purchase, with one anonymous industry source charac-
terizing it “as a restraint of trade investigation focused on whether NOCSAE and 
football helmet manufacturers have engaged in anti-competitive behavior.”45 As one 
scholar said, “[b]ecause standard-setting at its core poses a risk of improper collu-
sion, antitrust law has a long history of application in the context of standard-
setting organizations.”46 
Helmet manufacturers deny that NOCSAE has given them the ability to act as 
gatekeepers to aftermarket technology certification. A Rawlings spokesperson said, 
“[w]e the manufacturers are not certifying any after-market accessory carte blanche 
. . . .  If any manufacturer works in partnership with an after-market accessory 
[company], then they can secure 3rd party NOCSAE approval.”47 He compared sen-
sors to NFL helmet communication systems: “[e]very year, we have sent the NFL 
3rd-party NOCSAE approval with installation instructions so the equipment man-
agers can install the communication systems in Rawlings-specific models correct-
ly.”48 He suggested Rawlings might consider similar arrangements with other third-
party add-on manufacturers.49 
The fact remains that the licensing fees paid by helmet manufacturers to 
NOCSAE for the right to display the NOCSAE sticker on their helmets have long 
provided NOCSAE with most of the funds it needs to operate 50 Manufacturers’ rep-
 
43.      Report: FTC Investigation, supra note 11. 
44.      Id. 
45.      Id. 
46. George S. Carey, Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1241, 1242 
(2008). 
47. E-mail from Kurt Hunzeker, Rawlings Sports Goods, to Brooke de Lench, Executive Director, Mom-
sTEAM Institute (July 30, 2013, 9:08 AM) (on file with author). 
48. E-mail from Kurt Hunzeker, Rawlings Sports Goods, to Brooke de Lench, Executive Director, Mom-
sTEAM Institute (July 29, 2013, 6:52 PM) (on file with author). 
49.     Id. 
50.     See Hohler, supra note 5. 
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resentatives serve on NOCSAE’s board of directors and control four of its 16 votes.51 
As one NOCSAE critic told the Boston Globe, the fact that NOCSAE gets nearly all 
its funding from the stickers that helmet manufacturers can only put on their hel-
mets if they pay NOCSAE a fee and comply with its standards is “the definition of a 
conflict of interest . . . . If nearly 100 percent of your money comes from the manu-
facturers, then it’s difficult to say you’re independent of them.”52 
NOCSAE has not disclosed the extent of, or even whether, the helmet manufac-
turers influenced its decision to issue the Add-On Statement. However, the State-
ment’s broad reach raises questions. While NOCSAE says it is open to suggestions 
on how to improve the certification process for third-party add-on products,53 it has 
failed in the 16 months since the Add-On Statement was issued to propose any 
changes to the certification process as it relates to add-on products. 
II. NOCSAE’s Statement Regarding Certification of Third-Party 
Add-Ons is Unnecessarily Restrictive   
Of course, not every competitive restraint rises to the level of an antitrust viola-
tion.54 At the very least, however, NOCSAE’s position seems inadequate. NOCSAE’s 
current standard tests only football helmets’ ability to protect athletes from skull 
fractures, not concussions.55 NOCSAE readily acknowledges that its current stand-
ard does not test a helmets’ ability to mitigate concussion risks.56 NOCSAE also says 
its helmet performance standards are based “on years of scientific research.”57 Yet, 
labs under the direction of NOCSAE’s Technical Director have tested after-market 
helmet attachments, including the Brain Sentry Impact Sensor, and have found no 
adverse effect on helmet performance.58 NOCSAE’s statement also fails to distin-
 
51.     Id. 
52.     Id. (quoting Stefan Duma, head of the Virginia Tech-Wake Forest University School of Biomedical En-
gineering and Sciences). 
53.     Report: FTC Investigation, supra note 11. 
54.     See generally Carey, supra note 46. 
55.     NAT’L OPERATING COMM. ON STANDARDS FOR ATHLETIC EQUIP., STANDARD PERFORMANCE 
SPECIFICATION FOR NEWLY MANUFACTURED FOOTBALL HELMETS (Dec. 2013), available at http://nocsae.org/wp-
content/files_mf/1396898424ND00213m13MfrdFBHelmetsStandardPerformance.pdf. In June 2014, NOCSAE’s 
Board of Directors authorized a revision to its football helmet standard which would establish minimum stand-
ards for a helmet’s ability to attenuate some of the forces—both linear and rotational—that cause sports-related 
concussions, and open up the proposed standards for public comment until June 2015, at which time, provided 
there were no revisions, the board is expected to vote to finalize the standard and require implementation by 
manufacturers by June 2016. Press Release, Nat’l Operating Comm. on Standards for Athletic Equip., NOCSAE 
Board Approves First Helmet Standard to Address Concussion Forces (June 20, 2014), available at 
http://nocsae.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/NOCSAE-June-Board-Meeting-release-FINAL-6-20-14.pdf. 
56.      See CHSSA, NOCSAE Warns Football Helmet Rating System Cannot Predict Ability to Prevent Concus-
sions, CHSSANOW (June 9, 2014, 8:16 AM), http://chsaanow.com/2014-06-09/nocsae-warns-football-helmet-
rating-system-predict-ability-prevent-concussions/. 
57.     NOCSAE Overview, supra note 5. 
58.     See Jackman, supra note 29; see also Flyer, Brain Sentry, The Most Valuable Accessory You Can Buy, 
available at https://www.sportsmanager.us/%5CDocuments%5CDacula%5C21007.pdf. 
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guish between aftermarket products intended to measure impact forces and prod-
ucts specifically designed to mitigate concussion risks, which seemingly are more 
likely to alter the performance characteristics of a helmet. 
In response to NOCSAE’s announcements, sensor manufacturers emphasized 
that their products have undergone extensive lab tests, which confirm that sensors 
do not affect helmets’ ability to prevent skull fractures.59 One sensor manufacturer 
CEO distinguished between concussion sensors and aftermarket padding—while 
“removing padding or modifying the structure of the helmet could be extremely 
detrimental[,]” lightweight helmet sensors are fundamentally different because they 
are much lighter than padding and “do[ ] not alter the geometry of the shell.”60 Im-
pakt Protective’s CEO said his company, which makes a sensor that is inserted be-
tween the padding inside a helmet’s shell, has “data galore” to show that helmet 
sensors are safe and meet NOCSAE standards.61 
As a leading sports doctor has opined, “‘[t]he best thing we can do for the player 
with a potential head injury is to provide immediate evaluation . . .’”62 Sensors do 
just that. In response to a question as to whether a helmet sensor attachment might 
degrade a football’s ability to prevent skull fractures, a biomechanical engineer, Dr. 
Albert King, said, “unless you need to drill into the helmet, it should be okay. I 
think this is more of a legal issue than a biomechanical issue.”63 
In 2012, the Newcastle High School football team in Newcastle, Oklahoma beta-
tested Shockbox impact sensors.64 Shortly before the season began, the school’s at-
torney raised liability and warranty concerns.65 Shockbox moved swiftly to address 
these concerns by arranging to drop-test a Shockbox-equipped Schutt football hel-
met.66  The test confirmed that the sensor did not affect the helmet’s performance, 
Schutt assured the school that the sensors did not void its warranty, and the beta 
test proceeded.67 
 
59.     Crossman claimed that Shockbox had been tested in the labs of helmet manufacturers as recently as 
April 2013 and that the sensor did not affect the performance of the helmet: “There have been over 45,000 im-
pact tests with Shockbox in and on helmets by Impakt Protective in our test labs with over 500 youth athletes 
using Shockbox in clinical research trials. No helmets cracked, no-one was injured, no warranties were voided.” 
E-mail from Danny Crossman, Chief Executive Officer, Impakt Protective Inc., to Brooke de Lench, Executive 
Director, MomsTEAM Institute (July 24, 2013, 9:27 AM) (on file with author). 
60.     E-mail from Scott Jacko, VP of Business Development, SafeBrain, to Brooke de Lench, Executive Direc-
tor, MomsTEAM Institute (July 28, 2013, 5:09 PM) (on file with author). 
61.     E-mail from Danny Crossman, supra note 42. 
62.     E-mail from Scott Jacko, supra note 60 (quoting Dr. Martin Mrazik, Clinical Neuropsychologist and 
NHL/CFL concussion consultant). 
63.     Telephone Interview by Brooke de Lench with Albert King, Chair of Biomedical Eng’g Dep’t, Wayne 
State Univ. (July 29, 2013). 
64.     See THE SMARTEST TEAM: MAKING HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL SAFER (PBS broadcast Aug. 14, 2013). 
65.     Id. 
66.     Id. 
67.     Id. 
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Although the beta test involved only a limited number of helmets and sensors, its 
results encouraged sensor manufacturers, players, and coaches. Newcastle’s athletic 
trainer called the sensors “the next best thing to being inside a [player’s] brain.”68  
Further, a Newcastle player admitted, “[a] lot of the guys, they don’t want to come 
out when they get a concussion, . . . [but] when that sensor goes off, you got hit 
hard and the coaches are gonna [sic] pull you out no matter what.”69 Many players 
acknowledged that they did not want to have the responsibility of reporting their 
concussions any longer, and instead wanted the sensors to alert coaches.70 
Such anecdotes beg the question: on what reasonable basis did NOCSAE make 
its decision? Mike Oliver, NOCSAE’s Executive Director and General Counsel, not-
ed, “Manufacturers regularly make football helmets that exceed the performance 
requirements . . . so that even with 3 standard deviations applied, a helmet’s per-
formance would still meet the NOCSAE standard.”71  NOCSAE only explained that 
the addition of add-ons (including sensors) “to a certified helmet changes the mod-
el, by definition, under NOCSAE standards” and creates a new untested model.72 
Still, given the ability of current helmets to comfortably meet existing certification 
standards, NOCSAE’s position makes little sense.  NOCSAE should have recognized 
the sensors’ potential to improve player safety, and should have distinguished be-
tween sensors intended to alert the sideline to impacts that might cause concussive 
injury and aftermarket add-ons which claim to attenuate concussive forces and 
hence, by definition, change the ability of the helmet-add-on combination to pro-
tect against such forces. 
III. NOCSAE’s Third-Party Add-On Statement May Have Put Liabil-
ity Concerns of Helmet Manufacturers Ahead of Promoting Player 
Safety 
There is also a concern that NOCSAE’s public re-statement may have been driven 
more by a desire to protect helmet manufacturers from potential legal liability in 
the event a player suffers a head injury than its “mission to enhance athletic safe-
ty.”73  
NOCSAE’s statements did not mention liability concerns; they merely cited 
NOCSAE’s intent to protect the integrity of the NOCSAE standards.74 Nonetheless, 
 
68.     Interview with Damon Glass, Athletic Trainer, Newcastle High School (Oklahoma), in Newcastle, Okla. 
(July 20, 2012). 
69.     Interview with Collin Black, Football Player, Newcastle High School (Oklahoma), in Newcastle, Okla. 
(Aug. 12, 2013). 
70.     See THE SMARTEST TEAM, supra note 64. 
71.     Telephone Interview with Mike Oliver, Executive Director and General Counsel, Nat’l Operating 
Comm. on Standards for Athletic Equip. (July 22, 2013). 
72.     See NOCSAE Add-On Statement, supra note 12. 
73.     See NOCSAE Overview, supra note 5. 
74.     See NOCSAE July 2013 Statement, supra note 6; NOCSAE Add-On Statement, supra note 12. 
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several commentators have opined that liability concerns have motivated NOCSAE 
in the past.75 When a player sustains a head injury and then sues a school district or 
helmet manufacturer, the defendants can emphasize that the helmet met NOCSAE 
safety standards. Dr. Bob Cantu, a leading concussion expert and NOCSAE Vice 
President, admitted that NOCSAE has become concerned with legal liability.76 Alan 
Schwarz of the New York Times also noted “[i]f Nocsae were to supplement its hel-
met standard in an attempt to address concussions, it could open itself to lawsuits 
brought by players saying that their helmet did not prevent injury.”77 
Helmet manufacturers and schools share the same view on this issue.78 As one 
commentator has suggested, when an injured player sues, they can say “Hey, see, 
the product met the set standards.”79 Defendants could claim that, but for aftermar-
ket add-ons, helmets would have performed as designed.  Indeed, in one critic’s 
opinion, “NOCSAE exists for two reasons—to avoid skull fractures, and to avoid 
liability.”80 
Under current standards, helmet manufacturers may have little economic incen-
tive to invest in new technologies if doing so might increase their liability.81 “Sim-
plistic certification standards provide convenient legal cover for the manufactur-
ers[,]”82 while manufacturers that develop new helmet technology that is safer than 
the NOCSAE standards could expose themselves to liability.83 NOCSAE’s critics 
view the situation as harmful and backward.84 One aftermarket product CEO said, 
“If something is available that makes your helmet more safe [sic], you should be 
held liable for not using it.”85 
To the extent helmet manufacturers are reluctant to push for, or support, more 
rigorous safety standards, there is precedent in American business history. In the 
1960s, auto manufacturers resisted safety advocates’ efforts to require seatbelts in 
 
75.   See Alan Schwarz, As Injuries Rise, Scant Oversight of Helmet Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/sports/football/21helmets.html?emc=eta1&_r=3&; Tom Foster, The Hel-
met that Can Save Football, POPULAR SCI. (Dec. 18, 2012. 12:07 PM), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/ 
2012-12/helmet-wars-and-new-helmet-could-protect-us-all?nopaging=1. 
76.     See Schwarz, supra note 75. 
77.     Id. 
78.     Id. (“‘Manufacturers and schools, equipment managers and the coaches—the whole football industry—
don’t want to go after or even criticize the security blanket of Nocsae.’”) (quoting Sander Reynolds, Vice Presi-
dent for Product Development of Xenith football helmet manufacturer). 
79.     Id. (quoting Sander Reynolds, Vice President for Product Development of Xenith football helmet man-
ufacturer). 
80.     Id. (quoting Sander Reynolds, Vice President for Product Development of Xenith football helmet man-
ufacturer). 
81.     See Foster, supra note 75 (noting that current safety standards do not require companies to do anything 
more than they already do). 
82.     Id. 
83.     See id. (explaining that a company that goes “above and beyond standards” could put itself at risk of 
getting sued). 
84.     Id. 
85.     Id. (quoting Niklas Steenberg, CEO of MIPS Helmet). 
  
 Standard-Setting by Non-Governmental Agencies 
58 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
cars.86 As one commentator has noted, “[a]ll too often implementation hangs on the 
grim calculus of whether the cost to industry of adopting a safety measure is more 
or less than the cost to the public of going without it.”87 
The impact sensor market has not yet reached the tipping point. One expert ex-
plained, “because football helmets have already prevented deaths so effectively for 
decades, and because football’s faster and more violent environment leaves bio-
mechanists unsure of how to prevent concussion in the sport, Nocsae has[, until 
recently,] not asked helmet makers to even try” to adopt safer alternatives.88 Even 
Executive Director, Mike Oliver, said, “‘[w]hen you have something that has 
worked well for a lot of years, you have to be pretty cautious.’”89 
Considering all positions of the parties involved, in our opinion, NOCSAE’s 
Add-On Statement may set back concussion safety innovation. Importantly, it may 
inhibit helmet-safety research and product development by causing potential inves-
tors to question sensor technology’s commercial viability.90 We also believe that the 
decision may negatively impact concussion biomarker research, which could im-
prove sideline diagnosis methods and reveal sub-concussive hits’ long-term effects. 
IV. Helmet Manufacturers’ Response 
Helmet manufacturers reacted to NOCSAE’s Add-On Statement in a variety of 
ways. Schutt’s CEO said: 
We work with a number of inventors and outside companies to help them 
understand helmet impact dynamics. We do not certify or approve the use 
of third party products in our helmets. We make the best protective gear and 
prefer that nothing be added or subtracted from the manufactured product. 
When it leaves our facility, it is fully compliant with NOCSAE and other 
regulatory bodies, and it is fully insured and warranted. A company that 
seeks to alter the helmet in any way, needs to do its own certification under 
NOCSAE standards and needs to fund its own insurance. This is no differ-
ent than after market automotive or electronic enhancements.91 
 
86.     See Clyde Haberman, Lessons from the Past for a Future in Smart Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/15/us/lessons-from-the-past-for-a-future-in-smart-cars.html. 
87.     Foster, supra note 75. 
88.     Schwarz, supra note 75. 
89.     Id. (quoting Mike Oliver, Executive Director and General Counsel, NOCSAE). 
90.     See John Mangels, Technology May Help Detect a Concussion, but the Methods Are Still Evolving, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 15, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/science/index.ssf/2012/01/technology_ma 
y_help_detect_a_c.html (noting that the NFL still questions the accuracy of impact sensors). 
91.     E-mail from Glenn Beckmann, Director of Marketing Communications, Schutt Sports, to Brooke de 
Lench, Executive Director, MomsTEAM Institute (July 24, 2013) [hereinafter Erb Statement] (on file with au-
thor) (quoting Robert Erb, Chief Executive Officer, Schutt Sports). 
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Erb noted that Schutt specifically advises consumers that “alterations, additions 
or component deletions or removals you make to the helmet may void [its] warran-
ty and could adversely affect the protective capabilities of the helmet.”92 As far as 
helmet sensors, Erb said, while Schutt was “not currently contemplating getting in-
to the electronic sensor business[,] . . . . we are always open to working with third 
party electronic companies and universities.”93 
Erb raised several questions about helmet sensors’ efficacy. He suggested that 
sensors do not yet produce data that “can be relied upon to create a predictive 
model.”94 Erb also said, “a concussive injury—at least at this stage of scientific in-
quiry—has far too many variables. . . .”95 Another helmet manufacturer, on the oth-
er hand, distinguished sensors from other aftermarket safety products.96 She sug-
gested that her company would work with sensor manufacturers “to verify 
performance through the appropriate process of internal testing and then NOCSAE 
certification.”97 She explained that the requirement of additional testing is the best 
way to protect athletes and their families from what she characterized as “‘snake-
oil’” sales claims.98 
V. A Path Forward 
Although impact sensors are a new technology, scientists and doctors have identi-
fied several ways they can immediately improve player safety. First, they help identi-
fy players who have suffered impacts that may have caused concussions and whom 
coaches should remove from play for further evaluation on the sports sideline.99 
Second, sensors provide data that advances concussion research.100 Third, they alert 
coaches to players who frequently sustain high impacts hits, so coaches can teach 
them to position their bodies safely.101 
 
92.     Id.  Notwithstanding such statement, it should be noted that, in order to assuage concerns by the New-
castle, Oklahoma school system that equipping the helmets of players on its high school football team with 
Shockbox sensors for the beta-testing featured in the authors’ documentary, “The Smartest Team: Making High 
School Football Safer,” would void the manufacturer’s warranty, Schutt assured the school, after drop-testing of 
its helmet with the Shockbox sensor disclosed no change in its performance characteristics, that its warranty 
would remain in place. See THE SMARTEST TEAM, supra note 64.   
93.     Erb Statement, supra note 91. 
94.     Id. 
95      Id. 
96.     E-mail from Ashlee Quintero, National Sales Director, SG Helmets, to Brooke de Lench, Executive Di-
rector, MomsTEAM Institute (July 29, 2013, 1:52 PM). 
97.     Id. 
98.     Id. 
99.     See Mangels, supra note 90. 
100.   See Gary Mihoces, NFL Offering Millions for Helmet Innovations, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2013, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2013/09/04/helmets-concussions-roger-goodell/2768237/. 
101.   See Richard M. Greenwald et al., A Proposed Method to Reduce Underreporting of Brain Injury in Sports, 
22 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 83, 83–85 (Mar. 2012); Jeffrey Kutcher et al., What Evidence Exists for New Strategies 
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NOCSAE says it is open to suggestions on how to improve the certification pro-
cess for third-party add-on products, but has yet to propose any changes to its 
third-party add-on statement.  Sensor companies suggest that NOCSAE should: (1) 
establish standards for helmets that bear aftermarket safety products “where evi-
dence of compliance with the NOCSAE standard can be demonstrated;” (2) allow 
sensor manufacturers to “test at independent labs and obtain proof that their prod-
uct does not affect the helmet impact absorption as per the NOCSAE standard;” 
and (3) permit sensor manufacturers to provide NOCSAE “proof that any adhesives 
or attachment methods do not affect the material characteristics of the helmet 
shell.”102 
In the final analysis, while NOCSAE has every right to protect its standards’ in-
tegrity, consumers should determine winners and losers in the sports-safety market 
with minimal interference from standard-setting groups. In NOCSAE’s place, a 
government agency, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”), 
should take responsibility for setting standards for sensor certification. The CPSC 
has much experience in standard setting. Unlike NOCSAE, it is not funded by the 
companies that comply with its standards.103 Even an independent equipment certi-
fication NGO with greater transparency, such as ASTM International, would argua-
bly be better suited for the job. 
Notwithstanding the negative consequences that appear to have resulted from 
NOCSAE’s Add-On Statement, it likely will not screech concussion technology de-
velopment to a halt.104 Hopefully, a government agency will soon step in to set safety 
standards. In the meantime, schools, coaches, parents, athletic trainers, team doc-
tors, and athletes should weigh helmet sensors’ risks and benefits for themselves. As 
one leading concussion neurosurgeon says, “the era of ‘dumb helmets’, in which 
you have no clue how many impacts that [the] brain inside that helmet has sus-
tained, is quickly coming to an end.”105 In other words, with or without compliance 
with NOCSAE certification standards, impact sensors are here to stay. 
 
for Technologies in the Diagnosis of Sports Concussion Assessment of Recovery?, 47 BR. J. SPORTS MED. 299, 299–
303 (2013). 
102.     See Joint E-mail from Greg Merril, Chief Executive Officer, Brain Sentry Inc., Danny Crossman, Chief 
Executive Officer, Impakt Protective Inc., and Paul Walker, Chief Executive Officer, gForce Tracker Inc., to 
NOCSAE (July 25, 2013) (on file with author). 
103.     See Hohler, supra note 5 (“Several members of Congress, citing the apparent conflict and other con-
cerns, have advocated shifting authority over helmet standards to the US Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion if the current system does not soon produce substantial improvements.”); see also Hohler, supra note 1 
(noting that the “Sports Legacy Institute’s foray into licensing products is particularly unusual because [Dr.] 
Cantu recommended last year that impact sensors be certified by an independent, third-party agency” such as 
the American Society for Testing and Materials). 
104.     See Hohler, supra note 1 (noting that “[a]t least 10 sensors are currently on the market, and as many as 
20 others are in development”). 
105.     See Press Release, Arena Football League, supra note 31 (quoting Julian Bailes,  neurological consult-
ant to the NCAA and NFL Players’ Association). 
